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I. Introduction 
As Gideon v. Wainwright1 nears the ripe old age of fifty, we 
gathered at a conference at Washington and Lee University 
School of Law to reflect upon the meaning of the contemporary 
right to counsel. To my thinking, there is not one constitutional 
right to counsel, but two. There is a right to legal counsel and a 
right to extralegal counsel. The right to legal counsel applies 
principally to the formal domain of the criminal trial; the right to 
extralegal counsel applies exclusively to the comparatively 
unstructured domains of the plea-bargain and guilty plea. I 
acknowledge that the term extralegal is loaded and almost 
certainly too strong. By extralegal, I do not intend to signify a 
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 1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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practice unrecognized by law. Rather, I mean the aspects of a 
practice that are informed by influences beyond formal code law.2 
I recall vividly my first week as a public defender in the 
Bronx. I came to the job from a prestigious boutique white-collar 
defense firm that had represented such high-profile clients as 
Martha Stewart. I had done quite well at a top-ten law school and 
had completed a prestigious clerkship. But I remained wholly 
unprepared for practice in the Bronx criminal courts. No amount 
of training in the science of law could have provided me with the 
experiential wisdom required to master the art of local practice. 
Instead, I had to live the practice (and not just the law) before I 
could represent my clients effectively. The tired old adage holds 
that a good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the 
judge. The truth is not so simple. A great defense lawyer knows 
not only the law and the judge, but also the prosecutor, the court 
officers, the treatment providers, the social workers, the foreign-
language interpreters, the corrections and probation officers, the 
customs and norms of each and every courthouse subcommunity, 
the going plea rate, the criminal and so-called collateral 
consequences of conviction, the quickest path from one courtroom 
to another, the courthouse elevators that are perennially slow or 
broken, and, most of all, the client’s needs, objectives, and 
sympathetic characteristics.3 Most of this wisdom accrues 
independently of (or, at least, not entirely dependent upon) law. 
                                                                                                     
 2. Of course, some legal realists might counter that the term legal is 
defined necessarily as the law in practice. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic 
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 448 (1930) (“‘Real rules,’ 
then, if I had my way with words, would by legal scientists be called the 
practices of the courts, and not ‘rules’ at all.”). I appreciate that perspective, but, 
for present purposes, I bracket the question of what law does and does not 
include. That is, I concede that my definition of extralegal entails a controversial 
judgment about the nature of law, and I accept that, by some other measure, it 
may be the wrong term. But, that caveat aside, I consider the term extralegal to 
be sufficient—or, at least, sufficiently evocative.  
Finally, I grant also that all practices of criminal law—including trial 
practice—may be shaped by considerations beyond formal code law. My narrow 
point is that the Court has seen fit to regulate constitutionally such 
considerations only in the guilty-plea and plea-bargaining contexts. 
 3. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 3–5 (1979) 
(describing practice in lower criminal courts); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA 
BARGAINING 3–4 (1978) (same).  
TWO RIGHTS TO COUNSEL 1135 
That is, a great defense lawyer is more than just a legal 
technician; she is a sociologist, a psychologist, and a humanist.  
Of course, most facets of comprehensive defense practice are 
not the appropriate purview of constitutional constraint. But, 
until recently, the Supreme Court had turned an unhealthy blind 
eye to the realities. In essence, the Constitution had utterly failed 
to accommodate any and all practices beyond law. Most of defense 
practice was left to the domain of professional ethics or was 
unregulated altogether.4 Over the past five years, however, that 
has begun to change. The Court has adopted the constitutional 
perspective that it can no longer wholly sidestep messy practice 
questions. Through a trio of landmark rulings—Padilla v. 
Kentucky,5 Lafler v. Cooper,6 and Missouri v. Frye7—the Court 
has reached the understanding that conventional criminal justice 
primarily relies neither on trials nor even on law.8 To the 
contrary, the criminal-justice system is—as the Court recognized 
in Lafler—a system of pleas and plea-bargains.9 For a nation 
committed to the due process ideal, this may constitute an 
unfortunate reality, but it remains the reality nonetheless. More 
to the point, the right to effective assistance of counsel would 
                                                                                                     
 4. See, e.g., NAT. LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES 
FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (1995) (“[C]ounsel should attempt 
to become familiar with the practices and policies of the particular jurisdiction, 
judge and prosecuting authority which may affect the content and likely results 
of negotiated plea bargains.”). 
 5. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 6. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 7. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 8. See id. at 1407 (“The reality is that plea bargains have become so 
central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel 
have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be 
met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment 
requires . . . .”); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (“Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty 
pleas.”); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (“Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal 
convictions.”); see also Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: 
From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (2011) 
(“[A] solid majority of the Court at last sees that plea bargaining is the norm; 
sets the going rate; and needs consumer regulation and competent counsel to 
make it intelligent, voluntary, and just.”). 
 9. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).  
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mean very little if these principal practices were walled off from 
constitutional regulation. 
Admittedly, the Court has long recognized that a defendant 
has a right to effective assistance of counsel at a guilty plea (and 
even with respect to the negotiations and discussions that led to 
that guilty plea).10 But only now has the Court begun to recognize 
that the right to effective assistance of counsel, itself, actually 
means something different in the plea-bargaining context, and 
that, accordingly, constitutional doctrine crafted to promote the 
trial right to counsel is a poor fit for bargains and pleas. Simply, 
plea practice responds to different questions. Trials are (and 
ultimately should be) about guilt accuracy—that is, whether a 
defendant is legally guilty. A good lawyer may smuggle equitable 
considerations into her trial arguments to plant seeds of 
nullification, but the bottom-line question remains relatively 
scientific: Has the State demonstrated legal guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt? Comparatively, plea-bargains are (and 
ultimately should be) about more than legal guilt. They are about 
discretion. They are about fairness. They are—from the 
prosecutor’s perspective—about efficiency and optimal crime 
control. Such considerations invariably may overlap with legal 
questions, but sometimes they may also run counter to it. Indeed, 
often plea-bargaining provides a path out from under the 
unwelcome strictures of legislative commands, like mandatory-
minimum sentences and mandatory immigration and other so-
called collateral consequences. In this way, plea-bargaining is a 
tool to circumvent law.11  
I remember a particular example from my own practice. My 
client was charged with a violation—harassment in the second 
degree. A conviction would not have given my client a criminal 
record, but it potentially would have carried with it serious 
immigration consequences. To get out from under those 
consequences, I convinced the prosecutor to file a misdemeanor 
charge of assault in the third degree and to let my client plead 
                                                                                                     
 10. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (applying a two-part test 
applicable “to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel”). 
 11. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 
1969, 1975 (1992) (“Plea bargaining is to the sentencing guidelines as black 
markets are to price controls.”). 
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guilty to attempted reckless assault. The plea gave my client a 
criminal record, but it left him in a comparatively better 
immigration position.12 Here, then, was a defendant who 
creatively pled up to a higher charge. 
As the example demonstrates, plea-bargaining has more in 
common with contracts than conventional criminal procedure.13 A 
central contract law precept is that the parties may make their 
own law.14 Likewise, prosecutors and defense attorneys use plea-
bargaining to “establish the law of the locale rather than apply 
the law of the state.”15 It is said that “[t]he law of crime is 
                                                                                                     
 12. If memory serves, the defendant was better off for immigration 
purposes with the criminal conviction because mens rea mattered to the 
immigration inquiry, and the charge of harassment entailed a showing of actual 
intent, whereas the charge of attempted reckless assault entailed a less culpable 
mind state (and a fairly nonsensical one at that). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 240.26 (McKinney 2013) (providing that a person is guilty of harassment in 
the second degree when there is “intent to harass, annoy or alarm another 
person”), with id. § 120.00(2) (providing that a person is guilty of assault in the 
third degree when “[h]e recklessly causes physical injury to another person”). 
There are myriad other (somewhat more troubling) examples of what Joseph 
Colquitt has pejoratively termed “ad hoc plea bargaining.” See Joseph Colquitt, 
Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 698–99 (2000) (disapproving of the 
practice and providing that “[a]d hoc bargaining occurs when the parties suggest 
unsanctioned punishments or benefits in settling criminal cases”); see also, e.g., 
Gina Barton, Mystery Resolved but Not Solved, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 
24, 2006, at 1A (detailing defendant’s guilty plea to a reduced charge in 
exchange for submission to a hysterectomy); Jules Wagman, Vasectomy Plea 
Deal Represents Wacky Justice in Jacksonville, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 
1994, at A17 (describing defendants choice between injections of Depo-Provera 
or a vasectomy as part of a plea deal); The Sentence is Church, and Defendant 
Approves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at B18 (“[A] senior Federal judge here has 
ordered a woman and her four children to attend church services each Sunday 
for a year as part of a probation agreement in a drug case against her.”).  
 13. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992) (“Properly understood, classical contract theory 
supports the freedom to bargain over criminal punishment.”); see also, e.g., 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be 
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled.”). 
 14. See Harry W. Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 
43, 50–54 (1975) (discussing the dispersion of power in private contract law).  
 15. Colquitt, supra note 12, at 698. 
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special”16—that “crime belongs wholly to the law, and its 
treatment is exhaustively based on considerations of legality.”17 
Thus, the criminal justice system has rejected ostensibly soft—
and comparatively subjective—approaches to rulemaking, like 
the common-law method of crime creation.18 Yet the criminal 
justice system abides by the highly subjective art of making law 
by agreement. Formal legality is, in this way, more aspiration (or 
fiction) than reality. And, under prevailing criminal codes, it 
could not be otherwise, because code law is often too hard and 
disagreeable. In such circumstances, the stakeholders seek 
outlets from code law, and plea-bargaining is the prevailing 
outlet.  
In fact, the Court has come not only to tolerate efforts to 
bargain around code law; it has come to encourage them. The 
Court has come to recognize prosecutors and defense attorneys as 
the system’s real (and, in the Court’s view, appropriate) policy 
makers. Thus, the Court has concluded that effective assistance 
of bargaining counsel is and ought to be measured against their 
conception of the “sound administration of criminal justice.”19 In 
this way, the Court has constitutionally acknowledged a long-
apparent, practical rift between the distinct enterprises of trials 
by jury and pleas by bargain: whereas the criminal trial is an 
adjudicative and adversarial device designed to promote legal 
                                                                                                     
 16. Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the 
Junction of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
97, 97 (1996). 
 17. Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL R. 699, 700 (1967); see also Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating 
Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (1974) (discussing criminal law’s long 
tradition of “strict adherence to rules”). As Michael Seidman has observed, 
“although realism’s lessons for criminal law seem obvious, formalism continues 
to dominate criminal jurisprudence.” Seidman, supra note 16, at 103. 
 18. Conventionally, the legality principle is taken to require, at a 
minimum, that legislators codify offenses ex ante, and that police and 
prosecutors confine their collective attention to this “catalogue of what has 
already been defined as criminal.” HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL SANCTION 88–90 (1968) (observing that the principle of legality is 
unnecessary to minimize the prospect of arbitrariness and abuse). 
 19. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012); see generally Josh 
Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 40, 43 (2012) [hereinafter Bowers, Winning by Losing]. 
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accuracy (and, secondarily, to protect against coercion), the plea-
bargain is an administrative and collaborative device designed to 
promote fairness and efficiency (and, secondarily, to protect 
against deception and surprise).  
In this Article, I explore this longstanding practical (and 
emerging) jurisprudential rift between the meaning of effective 
assistance of counsel at bargain and trial. In Part II, I describe 
the Court’s methodological approach to plea-bargaining as 
distinct from its approach to traditional pretrial and trial 
procedures. Specifically, the Court has emphasized fair notice as 
opposed to guilt accuracy. In Parts III and IV, I examine the 
Court’s conventional methodological approach, which is 
comparatively indifferent to unfairness and surprise and 
comparatively more concerned with adversarial testing, guilt 
accuracy, and prophylactics against coercion. In Part V, I discuss 
the Court’s particular approach to coercion in the plea-bargaining 
context. In Parts VI and VII, I focus narrowly on the extralegal 
right to effective assistance of bargaining counsel in light of 
recent Court rulings expanding the right. Specifically, I claim 
that the Court has endorsed a richer conception of notice that 
obliges defense attorneys to keep defendants apprised of practice 
beyond law. And, even more than that, the Court may have also 
obligated defense attorneys to bargain hard. Finally, I briefly 
raise one of the most fascinating implications of the extralegal 
right to counsel: that a defense attorney may now be compelled to 
make extralegal arguments to the bargaining prosecutor that she 
is forbidden to make to the trial jury—particularly, arguments 
calculated to shortcut code law.  
II. The Constitutional Significance of Surprise 
In a separate essay, I argued that the Court has consistently 
adopted a distinct methodological approach to plea-bargaining—
specifically, a methodology informed principally by contract 
conceptions of fair notice and private ordering as opposed to 
legalistic conceptions of guilt-accuracy of the kind that tend to 
frame the rest of constitutional criminal procedure.20 That is, the 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello 
to Padilla: A Response to Professor Bibas, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 55 (2011) 
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Court has taken legal accuracy to be somewhat irrelevant—
neither here nor there (or, rather, not here in the plea-bargaining 
domain but there in traditional criminal procedure domains, like 
charging and trials).21 
I have defended the Court’s distinct methodological 
approach.22 But it is not without shortcomings. Chiefly, it has led 
the Court to dismiss—in unfounded and almost starry-eyed 
terms—the prospect of legally erroneous plea convictions.23 But 
the Court is not naïve. More likely, it recognizes—practically or 
cynically—that the criminal justice system would grind to a halt 
without well-oiled guilty-plea machinery (and a presumption of 
guilt keeps that machinery well-oiled).24 Thus, the Court has 
presumed that a pleading defendant is what he says he is—
guilty. Indeed, in North Carolina v. Alford,25 the Court even 
presumed a defendant guilty, notwithstanding his equivocation: 
                                                                                                     
[hereinafter Bowers, Fundamental Fairness] (“When it comes to contemporary 
constitutional trial procedure, accuracy is the prevailing coin of the realm; 
fundamental fairness is an afterthought . . . . [But] [i]n the plea-bargaining and 
guilty-plea contexts, the accuracy principle has played a smaller role as 
compared to fundamental fairness.”); see, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257, 261 (1971) (“Disposition of charges after plea discussions is . . . highly 
desirable . . . for many reasons . . . . However, all of these considerations 
presuppose fairness.”). As I previously discussed, cases like Santobello “can be 
re-read as an effort to cement a set of national (and constitutional) contract 
standards to promote fair and efficient bargaining between the guilty defendant 
and his prosecutor.” Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra, at 67 n.35. 
 21. See Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 20, at 56 (“In the plea-
bargaining and guilty-plea contexts, the accuracy principle has played a smaller 
role as compared to fundamental fairness.”); see also Bibas, supra note 8, at 
1139 (observing that the Padilla Court’s focus “reaches beyond a defendant’s 
factual guilt”). 
 22. See Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 20, at 67 (faulting “the 
Court only for the inadequacy of its constitutional rules and standards, not also 
for its dominant methodological approach”). 
 23. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (concluding 
that it did not believe that “the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of 
leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by 
competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves”). 
 24. Cf. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 (“‘[P]lea bargaining,’ is an essential 
component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be 
encouraged.”). 
 25. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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“I’m not guilty but I plead guilty.”26 The irony, then, is that plea-
bargains and guilty pleas have very little to do—jurisprudentially 
or practically—with guilt in the sense that legal guilt is never a 
litigated or constitutional question. This is not to say that legal 
guilt is wholly immaterial—just that the matter is settled already 
by the underlying determination that there is probable cause for 
the charges to which the defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
pleads (or away from which he bargains).27  
My immediate complaint, however, does not concern the 
innocence problem. My complaint runs the other way: that, by 
subjecting a prosecutor’s charging discretion to only a legalistic 
probable cause check, the Court has done too little to promote the 
substantive fairness of bargains and pleas. For example, in 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,28 the defendant rejected an offer of five 
years in prison for forging an eighty-eight dollar check.29 
Thereafter, the prosecutor carried out a threat to recharge the 
defendant as a habitual offender subject to a mandatory 
conviction sentence of life without parole—a sentence that the 
defendant in fact received.30 It did not matter whether life 
imprisonment was an appropriate punishment for smalltime 
forgery.31 “The only question . . . was . . . formal legality.”32 Cases 
like Bordenkircher reveal that, although plea-bargaining and 
guilty-plea jurisprudence is animated by fairness, the Court 
traditionally has endorsed only a cramped conception of 
                                                                                                     
 26. Id. at 28 n.2. The Alford Court observed: “Whether he realized or 
disbelieved his guilt, he insisted on his plea because in his view he had 
absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading.” Id. at 37 
(emphasis added). Significantly, the Court never questioned his guilt or the 
accuracy of the consequent conviction. 
 27. See Bibas, supra note 8, at 1133 (explaining that the Court has 
“assumed . . . that innocent defendants are very unlikely to plead guilty”); see 
also Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 20, at 58 (“[F]undamental 
fairness is the focus because there is little else on which to concentrate once the 
Court has deemed the accuracy question beside the point.”). 
 28. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
 29. Id. at 358–59. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 361 (addressing the conduct of the prosecutor).  
 32. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
258 (2001) (“The fairness of the charge [in Bordenkircher] was irrelevant.”). 
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fairness—that is, fair notice and fair dealing (procedural fairness) 
more than fair deals (substantive fairness).33 Ultimately, then, a 
prosecutor may exploit expansive substantive codes and 
mandatory sentencing laws to compel pleas, as long as she does 
so “forthrightly.”34 
Moreover, the Court typically has required that the 
defendant be made “fully aware” only of (i) the legal rights he 
sacrifices by plea and (ii) the legal consequences of taking the 
deal.35 In short, he has to comprehend only the generally 
applicable law, not also the specific manner by which the law 
applies to his case. That is, he does not need to know facts 
external to his legal rights and charges—such as, evidentiary 
facts about his chances of acquittal or practice facts about the 
kinds of plea offers typically available in the local courthouse.36 
But, as I examine in Part VI, the Court has come recently to 
endorse a richer conception of what constitutes unfair surprise.37 
III. The Constitutional Significance of Coercion 
In any event, even a cramped conception of notice constitutes 
a methodological approach distinct from conventional criminal 
                                                                                                     
 33. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (indicating that a 
voluntary plea requires that a defendant is “fully aware” of the consequences of 
pleading guilty); cf. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1922 (arguing that a plea-
bargain should be invalidated on contract-law grounds if the risk of fraudulent 
concealment is too great).  
 34. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (emphasizing 
“forthright[] . . . dealings with the defense” to avoid the kind of “unhealthy 
subterfuge that would drive the practice of plea bargaining back into the 
shadows”). 
 35. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 755–56 (providing the due process test for what 
the defendant must be made aware of in order to make an intelligent plea 
decision); see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) (“A plea of 
guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal 
elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful 
sentence.”). 
 36. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“[I]t is not sufficient 
for the criminal defendant seeking to set aside . . . a plea to show that . . . h[e] 
may not have correctly appraised . . . certain historical facts.”); see also Broce, 
488 U.S. at 764 (quoting Tollett). 
 37. Infra Part VI. 
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procedure doctrine. In traditional pretrial and trial contexts, the 
Court has exhibited comparatively more concern about coercion 
than unfair surprise, emphasizing repeatedly that coercive 
tactics—like coerced confessions—are constitutionally 
problematic because they undermine guilt accuracy.38 The Court’s 
conception of the trial right to counsel fits neatly within this 
model. It is a prophylactic against coercion intended to promote 
accurate adjudication thereby. That is, the trial right to counsel 
provides a buffer against state-sanctioned force in much the same 
way that other constitutional trial and pretrial protections serve 
as buffers against state-sanctioned force.39 All of these rules and 
standards—the right to trial counsel, the privilege against self-
incrimination, the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and rules and standards regulating the 
admission and exclusion of evidence—are means of “testing the 
prosecution” and its efforts to act against the liberty of the 
defendant.40 And, in order to effectively test the prosecution, a 
defendant requires the “guiding hand” of competent expert 
counsel, schooled in the “science of law”: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if 
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even 
                                                                                                     
 38. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1956) 
The tendency of the innocent . . . to risk remote results of a false 
confession rather than suffer immediate pain so strong that judges 
long ago found it necessary to . . . treat any confession made 
concurrently with torture or threat of brutality as too untrustworthy 
to be received as evidence of guilt. 
See also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Of 
course, no confession that has been obtained by any form of physical violence to 
the person is reliable and hence no conviction should rest upon one obtained in 
that manner.”); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1936) (finding a 
denial of due process when a confession was obtained by coercion). 
 39. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (observing that 
unconstitutional confession cases “all . . . contained a substantial element of 
coercive police conduct . . . [and] the integral element of police overreaching”).  
 40. John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1048–49 (1994). These 
procedural rules and standards are not just animated by the same logic. They 
grew up together in the eighteenth century. Id. at 1048. More to the point, 
Langbein has argued that the right to counsel is an adjunct to or source of all of 
these other rights. Id. 
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the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes 
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is 
incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the 
indictment is good or bad. . . . He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without 
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.41 
It is only after a defendant is duly convicted—
notwithstanding the efforts of competent counsel—that coercion 
becomes something other than an arbitrary exercise of force: it 
becomes a probabilistically accurate exercise of legal justice. As 
my colleague, Anne Coughlin, once remarked: “The absence of 
due process is experienced as the presence of force.”42 A good trial 
lawyer is a guarantor of due process, precisely because she 
possesses the technical tools to put legal charges to the test. She 
uses law to oppose legal efforts to use force. The touchstone is 
technical legal wisdom—the wisdom to navigate law; to find, in 
the words of the Court, “simple, orderly, and necessary” that 
which appears to the untrained layman “intricate, complex and 
mysterious.”43 
IV. Deception and Conventional Criminal Practice 
The Court is relatively indifferent to notice, as compared to 
coercion, in the conventional constitutional criminal procedure 
contexts. To the extent notice is relevant, it is only as a 
mechanism to promote accurate adjudication by minimizing 
confusion over the law’s meaning and reach. Consider, for 
                                                                                                     
 41. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932); see Michael J. Klarman, 
Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379, 397 (2009) (discussing Powell as an accuracy-
oriented decision). Anecdotally, the Gideon case itself offers a vivid illustration 
of the critical importance of counsel to an accurate disposition: on retrial, the 
jury took just one hour to acquit the defendant. See A.B.A., 50th Anniversary of 
Gideon v. Wainwright (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/project 
_press/2012/year-end/gideon_50.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“Mr. Gideon 
was acquitted after only an hour of jury deliberation.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. Katherine Calos, ‘Rally for Honor’ at U.Va.: Pride, Optimism Reign; 
Lawn Ralliers Hope Pressure Will Force Board to ‘Right the Wrong,’ Reinstate 
Sullivan, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 25, 2012, at A-01 (quoting Coughlin).  
 43. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). 
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instance, the one type of deception that the Court consistently 
has forbidden: state actors are not permitted to make false claims 
of legal authority. Thus, a police officer cannot order a suspect to 
submit to a search or seizure that the suspect has a legal right to 
refuse,44 and a prosecutor cannot improperly comment on the 
import of the defendant’s exercise of his constitutional rights.45 
These ploys and misstatements are impermissible precisely 
because they run the risk of reshaping the meaning and reach of 
law and thereby undermining its accurate administration.  
By contrast, the Court generally has tolerated efforts to hide 
the relevant facts from suspects and defendants. A police officer 
may conceal his identity to gain access to a suspect’s home or to 
extract his confession, and a prosecutor typically may spring trial 
surprises and conceal evidence.46 Here, deception and subterfuge 
are permissible because the defendant is not fooled about the law 
but only about the facts. Law and its accurate application are left 
unaffected. Consider, for instance, Moran v. Burbine.47 In Moran, 
the Court held incriminating statements admissible when the 
police failed to inform a suspect that his attorney had called the 
precinct and had attempted to invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination and his attendant Miranda48 right to counsel.49 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (holding 
invalid a consent to search when officers falsely claimed they possessed a 
warrant); see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011) (holding that 
officers may create exigent circumstances by knocking loudly on an apartment 
door as long as they “do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or 
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 45. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179–82 (1986) (discussing 
improper comments made by the prosecutor). 
 46. See White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745, 745 (1971) (holding that 
police may record surreptitiously conversations between informants and 
suspects without implicating the Fourth Amendment); see also Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (“Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic 
deception by taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes 
to be a fellow prisoner.”); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) 
(holding that police may go undercover without implicating the Fourth 
Amendment). As is probably familiar to anyone who watches police-procedural 
television programs, interrogating officers are free to lie about, for example, the 
strength of the State’s evidence or the cooperation of a confederate. 
 47. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
 48. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 49. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 434 (holding that “the Court of Appeals erred in 
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According to the Court, the interrogation was constitutional 
because the police had provided the suspect his Miranda 
warnings, and the suspect had waived his rights and agreed to 
speak.50 In short, the Court concluded that the defendant was 
entitled constitutionally to understand that he had a legal right 
to counsel but not that he had a lawyer in fact. (In any event, 
Miranda is the only conventional criminal procedure context in 
which the Court has even obliged state actors to make suspects 
and defendants affirmatively aware of their legal rights.)51 
And notice what else the Court has deemphasized. 
Procedural fairness is no central part of the inquiry. That is, the 
Court has refused to consider whether gamesmanship of the kind 
found in Moran is unfair according to some ontic measure, 
because the officers’ efforts to play with the facts did not impede 
(and may well have promoted) legally accurate adjudication. In 
this vein, even the ostensible exceptions prove the rule. 
Specifically, a prosecutor cannot affirmatively manipulate or 
misstate the evidence.52 Additionally, she has an affirmative duty 
                                                                                                     
finding that the Federal Constitution required the exclusion of the three 
inculpatory statements”). Indeed, the Court deemed irrelevant the fact that 
police had falsely assured defense counsel that the suspect would not be 
interrogated. Id. at 419.  
 50. See id. at 421 (finding that the defendant validly waived his Miranda 
rights). 
 51. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (providing that “[t]he warning to remain 
silent must be accompanied by the explanation . . . [and] is needed to order to 
make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of 
forgoing it”). Repeatedly, the Court has refused to extend Miranda-type 
affirmative warnings to other contexts. For instance, police need not warn 
defendants of their right to refuse to comply with drug interdiction efforts or 
with a request for consent to search. See United States v. Drayton, 535 U.S. 194, 
194 (2002) (holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police 
officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and refuse to 
consent to searches”); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 
(1973) (holding that “when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State 
attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in 
fact voluntarily given”). 
 52. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (providing that “it 
is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even 
universally condemned” but that instead “[t]he relevant question is whether the 
prosecutors’ comments so infected the trial with unfairness to make the 
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to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence.53 On both scores, a contrary rule would 
undermine guilt accuracy.54 
V. Coercion and Plea-Bargaining Practice 
In the bargaining context, the Court has not only done more 
to promote affirmative notice, it has proven more willing to 
tolerate coercion. Indeed, one legal historian has even cheekily 
equated the modern practice to the medieval practice of 
torture55—a provocative bit of hyperbole, no doubt, but one that 
underscores the intense pressure to bargain that the Court has 
both authorized and encouraged.56 To be fair, I recognize that the 
Court has seen fit to forbid plea-bargaining pressure that 
amounts to “actual or threatened physical harm” or “mental 
coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”57 However, it has 
held expressly that the kind of mental coercion implicit to a 
charge—even to a capital charge or mandatory charge of life 
without parole—does not qualify as mental coercion.58 As long as 
                                                                                                     
conviction a denial of due process”). 
 53. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution”); see also 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 667 (1985) (holding “that evidence 
withheld by government is ‘material,’ as would require reversal of conviction, 
only if there is reasonable probability that, had evidence been disclosed to 
defense, result of proceeding would have been different”). 
 54. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (providing when suppression of evidence 
violates due process); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) 
(“[The] deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known 
false evidence is incompatible with ‘rudimentary demands of justice.’”). 
 55. See John H. Langbein, Plea Bargaining and Torture, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 
3, 13 (1978) (“Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive.”). 
 56. Supra note 20 and accompanying text (referencing Santobello). 
 57. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). 
 58. See id. at 755 (“[A] plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered 
to avoid the possibility of a death penalty.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (holding “that the course of conduct engaged in by the 
prosecutor . . . which no more than openly presented the defendant with the 
unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was 
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any such charge is legally supportable, the attendant pressure 
amounts to no more than legal justice in action.59 At that point, 
the only relevant inquiry is notice. Thus, in Bordenkircher, the 
threatened habitual offender charge was deemed to be 
constitutional, because the prosecutor had made his intention to 
add the count clear “at the outset of the plea negotiations.”60 
Likewise, in Mabry v. Johnson,61 the defendant’s plea conviction 
was deemed to be constitutional because the Court found that it 
was “in no sense the product of governmental deception.”62 
Particularly, the Mabry Court had concluded that “[r]espondent 
was fully aware of the likely consequences when he pleaded 
guilty,” and, thus, it was “not unfair to expect him to live with 
those consequences now.”63  
Simply, the Court has taken the position that the pressure to 
bargain away from a cognizable charge is nothing more than an 
“inherent” and acceptable part of the process.64 “[F]orce, threats, 
or promises” are legally significant only when they are “other 
than promises in a plea agreement.”65 In this way plea-
bargaining is self-actualizing. Consider, for instance, the 
defendant’s involuntariness claim in Brady v. United States,66 
which was the Supreme Court’s initial decision holding 
constitutional the practice of plea-bargaining.67 The defendant 
                                                                                                     
plainly subject to prosecution, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 59. Cf. Langbein, supra note 55, at 13 n.24 (“Coercion authorized by law is 
different from coercion meant to overcome the guarantees of law.”). 
 60. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 360. 
 61. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984). 
 62. Id. at 510. 
 63. Id. at 511. 
 64. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (discussing that 
the pressure to bargain for a plea deal is often advantageous to both the 
defendant and to the prosecution). 
 65. United States v. Frook, 616 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 11(b)). 
 66. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 67. See id. at 758 (“[C]ourts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are 
voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate 
advice of counsel that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of 
the defendants’ admissions that they committed crimes with which they are 
charged.”). 
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faced a capital charge and argued, in essence, that he was scared 
to death (or to plea) by the prospect of trial conviction and 
consequent sentence.68 The defendant took the prosecutor’s 
message to be: “If you don’t plead, we may kill you.”69 Yet, the 
Court rejected the claim that such a convincing message was 
coercive, concluding simply that there was no evidence that the 
defendant was “so gripped by the fear of death” that he could not 
rationally weigh the advantages of pleading guilty.70 Or, rather, 
the Court dismissed the claim precisely because the prosecutor’s 
message was so clear. All that mattered was that the charge was 
valid and that the defendant had his eyes open to it. This is a 
perspective that sounds squarely in contract theory. Consider the 
following Commentary to the Uniform Commercial Code: “The 
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair 
surprise . . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because 
of superior bargaining power.”71 In other words, one party’s 
superior ability to turn the bargaining screws is of far less 
significance than the other party’s ability (or inability) to 
recognize that fact.  
In Brady, the risk of coercion was of little importance 
because legal guilt was not an open question. That is, the Court 
considered the question of legal guilt foreclosed by the 
defendant’s willingness to plead guilty to a legally supported 
charge. And according to this logic, there is no need to protect 
against coercion once there is no prosecution case to test.  
VI. The Implications of the Changing Face of Bargaining Surprise  
To summarize, because conventional constitutional criminal 
procedure cares comparatively less about autonomy and fairness, 
and comparatively more about technical guilt accuracy, it puts a 
                                                                                                     
 68. See id. at 746 (arguing that a guilty plea is invalid “when the fear of 
death is shown to have been a factor in the plea”). 
 69. Cf. Langbein, supra note 55, at 15 (“The tortured confession is, of 
course, markedly less reliable than the negotiated plea, because the degree of 
coercion is greater. . . . But the resulting moral quandary is the same.”); Scott & 
Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1920 (describing as coercive a prosecutor’s “strategic 
manipulation” of trial and bargaining sentencing differentials). 
 70. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (1970). 
 71. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2004). 
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premium on protecting against coercion; because constitutional 
bargaining and guilty plea procedure cares comparatively more 
about autonomy and fairness, and comparatively less about the 
perceived settled question of technical guilt accuracy, it puts a 
premium on promoting informed choice. Implicit in the notion of 
the conventional adversarial system is the notion of conflict—of 
force and the resistance to it.72 Implicit in private ordering—in 
contract and compromise—is the notion of fair notice and dealing. 
Again, this is not to say that an adversarial system is wholly 
unconcerned with notice or that a cooperative system is wholly 
unconcerned with coercion. Just that one system will prioritize 
one value and the other system will prioritize the other. Thus, for 
instance, the term “voluntariness” has a radically different 
meaning in contexts of confessions and plea-bargains. For 
confessions, voluntariness serves to protect against crushing 
pressure; for plea-bargains, voluntariness serves to guarantee 
informed choice.73  
Looking narrowly at the right to counsel, defense lawyers are 
“necessities, not luxuries” in all critical stages of the criminal 
process, but for different reasons.74 The trial—or legal—right to 
counsel is “implicit in the concept of an ordered liberty” (and 
therefore constitutionally required) because it forecloses coercion 
and promotes legally accurate adjudication,75 whereas the 
                                                                                                     
 72. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 11 (Paul H. 
Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009) (describing 
the “criminal law’s coerciveness” as “a dog of such ferocity” and as a “euphemism 
for intimidation, brutality, and violence”). These buffers are necessary because, 
according to Dan-Cohen: “[T]o be ruled also means to be subject to various forms 
of violence and brutality.” Id. at 28. 
 73. Compare Brady, 397 U.S. at 749 (distinguishing the contexts of 
confessions from bargains and pleas), with Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 
542 (1897) (“[W]herever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent 
because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the fifth 
amendment to the constitution . . . that no person ‘shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”). 
 74. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 75. Id.; see also HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 
172 (1968) (“If the process is seen as a series of occasions for checking its own 
operation, the role of counsel is a much more nearly central one . . . . The reason 
for this is to be found in the assumption . . . that the process is an adversary 
one.”). 
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bargaining—or extralegal—right to counsel is “implicit in the 
concept of an ordered liberty” because it forecloses surprise and 
promotes fair administration.76 Bargaining counsel serves less as 
a buffer against state power and more as a lens to draw the 
state’s power into sharp focus. Specifically, the defense attorney 
ensures that the bargain is struck and the plea is executed with 
sufficient transparency because a lack of adequate notice may 
keep her client from appreciating the kind of plea-bargaining 
pressure that the Court has taken to be part and parcel of the 
lawful “give and take.”77 Some notion of coercion may still be 
significant, but, by the Court’s reasoning, there is no 
impermissible coercion to a charge that is supported by probable 
cause.78 For the Court, it matters terrifically that prosecutors 
apply pressure with the law, not with their hands.  
It is my position that, in both conventional and bargaining 
contexts, the Court has paid insufficient attention to one 
constitutional value or the other. But, for present purposes, I am 
concerned with plea-bargaining only. I do not believe that it is 
misguided to adopt a distinct methodological approach in the 
bargaining context. The Court is right to conclude that pleas and 
trials are dissimilar enterprises that demand dissimilar 
treatment. But dissimilar treatment need not translate to 
disregard for the secondary value. The Court has failed to grasp 
this even in its recent plea-bargaining decisions. However, the 
Court has expanded the constitutional scope of fair notice, and, in 
its own way, that fresh conception may have also served to soften 
the harshest aspects of coercive contemporary plea practice. The 
Court first introduced this fresh conception in Padilla v. Kentucky 
when it approved of “creative” bargaining to circumvent 
mandatory sentencing and so-called collateral consequences that 
                                                                                                     
 76. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342. 
 77. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). 
 78. Thus, a bargaining prosecutor may keep badgering a defendant to 
accept a plea offer without undercutting the voluntariness of a consequent 
knowing and intelligent guilty plea. Comparatively, a police officer can ask for 
consent to search only so many times before submission is construed as 
involuntary, a suspect need invoke his Miranda rights only once to cut off 
custodial interrogation, and a trial prosecutor can only address a question to a 
testifying defendant once before it is asked and answered. 
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may prove disproportionate or inefficient in application.79 Again 
in Lafler and in Frye, the Court endorsed bargaining as a 
permissible mechanism to circumvent law. But the Court went 
further still. It extended the constitutional guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel to rejected plea offers.80  
This is a significant development for two underappreciated 
reasons. First, as Justice Scalia revealed in a pair of 
characteristically scathing dissents, the Court could not have 
made this move without concurrently recognizing a constitutional 
entitlement to plead guilty.81 As Justice Scalia suggested, it is a 
practical tautology that counsel can only unconstitutionally fail to 
exercise duties that she is constitutionally obliged to perform.82 
And, critically, the Court had never held previously that 
bargaining constituted such a duty. To the contrary, the Court 
had repeatedly declared (in sum and substance) that “there is no 
constitutional right to plea bargain,”83 and that the plea-bargain 
is, accordingly, of no constitutional import: 
                                                                                                     
 79. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (discussing the ability 
of the parties to bargain “creatively” to avoid mandatory deportation); see also 
Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1492 n.10 (2012) (“Armed with the 
knowledge that a guilty plea would preclude travel abroad, aliens like Vartelas 
might endeavor to negotiate a plea to a nonexcludable offense . . . .”). 
 80. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (applying 
“Strickland’s prejudice test where ineffective assistance results in a rejection of 
the plea offer and the defendant is convicted at the ensuing trial”); Missouri v. 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012) (providing that “[t]o show prejudice from 
ineffective counsel where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of 
counsel’s deficient performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable 
probability they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been 
afforded effective assistance of counsel”). 
 81. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1395 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the 
majority’s holding in light of the preexisting well-established rule that a 
defendant has no entitlement to a plea-bargain). However, just because the 
Court may have now recognized a constitutional entitlement to bargain it does 
not follow that the defendant has a right to be offered a plea. See id. at 1387 
(majority opinion) (“[A] defendant has no right to be offered a plea . . . . If a plea 
bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of 
counsel in considering whether to accept it.”); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 
545, 561 (1977) (“[T]he prosecutor need not [plea-bargain] if he prefers to go to 
trial.”).  
 82. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 83. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561. 
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A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional 
significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement, which 
until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an 
accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected 
interest.84 
This is not to say that the Court had left plea negotiations 
wholly unregulated. Because due process requires that the 
ultimate plea be knowing and voluntary, the Court had long 
recognized that the defendant enjoys a right to counsel with 
respect not only to the plea proceeding, but also to the 
negotiations and discussions that led to it.85 In Lafler and Frye, 
however, the Court applied the right to counsel to plea 
negotiations and discussions even in the absence of a plea.86  
Justice Scalia saw this as an unprecedented expansion of the 
right to counsel. For him, “bad plea bargaining has nothing to do 
with ineffective assistance of counsel in the constitutional sense” 
because a defendant has no right to plea-bargain in the first 
instance.87 All that may be said is that the defendant was “denied 
a right the law simply does not recognize.”88 And, descriptively, 
Justice Scalia is right. The Court had to have determined that 
the “bargain standing alone” has some constitutional significance 
after all:89  
[T]he Court today opens a whole new field of constitutionalized 
criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law. . . . The Court has 
never held that [constitutional regulation] extends to all 
                                                                                                     
 84. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984) (“It is [only] the ensuing 
guilty plea that implicates the Constitution.”). 
 85. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 54 (1985) (recognizing a right to 
effective assistance of counsel at negotiations that lead to guilty pleas); Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (noting that guilty pleas “not only must 
be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”). 
 86. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (stating that “the 
performance of respondent’s counsel was deficient when he advised respondent 
to reject the plea offer”); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (“The 
challenge is not to the advice pertaining to the plea that was accepted but rather 
to the course of legal representation that preceded it with respect to other 
potential pleas and plea offers.”). 
 87. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1393 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 1395. 
 89. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507. 
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aspects of plea negotiations, requiring not just advice of 
competent counsel before the defendant accepts a plea bargain 
and pleads guilty, but also the advice of competent counsel 
before the defendant rejects a plea bargain and stands on his 
constitutional right to a fair trial. The latter is a vast 
departure from our past cases, protecting . . . a judicially 
invented right to effective plea bargaining. . . . Today, . . . the 
Supreme Court of the United States elevates plea bargaining 
from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.90 
Second, Lafler and Frye are significant decisions for what 
they say about the Court’s perspective on plea-bargaining and the 
place the practice occupies in the criminal justice system. 
Specifically, the Court signaled that a plea-bargain is the 
expected mode of disposition, announcing that “it is not some 
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system.”91 Simply, a bargain is more than just consistent with 
law; it is law.92 As I have argued elsewhere, this amounts to an 
unconventional, expansive, and even dubious conception of what 
law is. According to this perspective, law is only that which 
prosecutors and defense attorneys do—whether what they do 
reflects or, conversely, deviates from the dictates of code law.93 
This is a conception of law as practice—or “practice law,” as I 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id. at 1391–97 (discussing “counsel’s plea-bargaining skills, which must 
now meet a constitutional minimum”). Jenny Roberts, one of the contributors to 
this volume, has expressed a similar view. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea 
Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 10) 
(“Surely, if the Court meant to limit the right to effective assistance to informing 
and counseling defendants about formal plea offers . . . it would not have 
repeatedly used the words ‘plea-bargaining,’ ‘plea negotiations,’ and ‘negotiation 
of a plea bargain.’ . . . . [I]t logically follows that there is a right to effective 
bargaining counsel.”) (manuscript on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 91. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 13, at 
1912); see also id. (describing plea-bargains as “so central to the administration 
of the criminal justice system . . . [that] the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather 
than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a 
defendant”). 
 92. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012) (concluding that plea-
bargaining is not “outside the law”). 
 93. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 127 (“[T]he legislator 
is subservient to the prosecutor because the prosecutor largely controls the plea 
bargaining regime.”). 
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termed it.94 And, in this way, I share Justice Scalia’s skepticism.95 
According to Justice Scalia, “the law is the law” and plea-
bargaining is “incompatible” with it (even if it is practically 
inevitable).96  
But, though Justice Scalia may have the better end of the 
argument descriptively, I do not agree that plea-bargaining—by 
virtue of its extralegal status—ought also to fall beyond 
constitutional regulation.97 To the contrary, the Court’s decisions 
reflect a welcome recognition that—whether plea-bargaining is 
deemed law or, more accurately, practice—it remains at least as 
“intricate, complex and mysterious”98 as trial, and, thus, it 
demands constitutional regulation.99 Indeed, bargaining may be 
even more complex and mysterious, because it entails wisdom 
and craft that transcend law. Thus, the defense lawyer must 
understand not only the formal substantive and procedural legal 
rules and standards (and the manner by which these rules and 
standards intersect with facts), but also the local practice (and 
the manner by which that practice intersects—or fails to 
intersect—with law and facts).  
Simply, competent plea-bargaining and trial advocacy 
require a lawyer to rely upon distinct skill sets. First and 
foremost, effective assistance of counsel at trial demands a sound 
understanding of the science of law, whereas effective assistance 
of counsel at bargain demands a sound understanding of the art 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. 
 95. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Missouri v. 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1412–14 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 96. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he law is the 
law, and those who break it should pay the penalty provided. . . . Today, 
however, the Supreme Court of the United States elevates plea bargaining from 
a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.”); see also id. (“[W]e accept plea 
bargaining because many believe that without it our long and expensive process 
of criminal trial could not sustain the burden imposed on it, and our system of 
criminal justice would grind to a halt.”). 
 97. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 129 (“[P]lea 
bargaining may provide an extralegal outlet. But it does not translate that the 
practice—as the dominant mode of criminal case disposition—is thereby 
unworthy of constitutional oversight.”). 
 98. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). 
 99. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (“The art of negotiation is at least as nuanced 
as the art of trial advocacy.”). 
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of extralegal persuasion. Of course, trial advocacy is not pure 
science. To the contrary, a brilliant cross-examination or closing 
argument involves a nontechnical (and sometimes 
improvisational) element of performance art.100 Nevertheless, the 
bottom-line trial question remains a technical question: whether 
the admissible evidence is sufficient to prove legal guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. By contrast, the bottom-line bargaining 
question is informed by the technical legal question only partially 
(and sometimes not much at all). That is, although bargaining is 
shaped by the shadow of substantive law, it is shaped also (and 
often principally) by normative considerations (like 
blameworthiness and fair sentence), practical considerations (like 
extant resource constraints), and political considerations (like 
public safety, crime control, and social control).101 In short, it is 
shaped not only by what the law is, but also by what legal 
professionals do with law in practice—what professionals make of 
the law. 
Even an optimal substantive criminal code will only 
sometimes reflect and express the (somewhat conflicting) 
considerations that inform plea-bargaining. Ultimately, it is an 
empirical question just how often the practice of plea-bargaining 
traces the shadow of substantive law or, comparatively, how often 
it blurs or obscures law altogether. In any event, because some 
degree of mismatch is endemic, the practice of plea-bargaining is 
inevitably extralegal to some (probably not insignificant) 
degree.102 Particularly in the context of enforcement of petty 
crimes and mandatory sentencing laws, the lawyer’s bargaining 
                                                                                                     
 100. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 681, 693 (1984) 
(“[A]dvocacy is an art and not a science . . . . [A]n act or omission that is 
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.”). 
 101. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and 
Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004). 
 102. Colquitt, supra note 12, at 699 (“When the parties reach ad hoc 
settlements, they act outside the law.”); Langbein, supra note 55, at 16–17 
(“When people who have murdered are said to be convicted of wounding . . . 
[t]his willful mislabelling plays havoc with . . . the moral force of the criminal 
law.”); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 29, 38 (2002) (“[T]he compromise outcome allows the prosecutor to 
respond to the ‘equities’ in particular cases.”). 
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arguments often become less legal and more normative or policy-
driven. That is, the defense attorney may direct her efforts not to 
the question of whether the substantive law technically applies, 
but rather why it should not be applied in this case. In such 
circumstances, plea-bargaining reshuffles conventional 
adversarial roles (and distorts conventional institutional 
architecture), by pitting collaborative prosecutors and defense 
attorneys against legislative prescription and command. 
If nothing else, almost all plea-bargains demand that the 
prosecutor disregard a measure of legal guilt in exchange for the 
defendant’s acceptance of some of it. And, by that nature, plea-
bargaining describes an extralegal project—at least as compared 
to trial advocacy. Moreover, the art of practice is not just 
somewhat extralegal, it is decidedly local—a kind of localism that 
was once exercised by juries, but that is now the province of 
professional lawyers.103 
Until recently, the Court had failed to accommodate these 
practice realities. As indicated, it constitutionally required that 
the defendant plead guilty with only his legal eye open—that is, 
with awareness of his legal rights and the legal consequences of 
the plea.104 A pleading defendant did not need to also understand 
legal facts about the merits or existence of available defenses, 
much less practice facts about the quality of his plea as measured 
against the prevailing norms and customs of the local courthouse. 
That has now changed (albeit to a somewhat uncertain degree). 
After Lafler and Frye, a defense attorney apparently must do 
more than merely provide legal notice of pending and prospective 
charges, trial rights, and bargaining consequences. A defense 
attorney also must provide at least some notice in some 
circumstances of opportunities to circumvent pending and 
prospective charges.  
The question remains open, however, of what notice under 
which circumstances. Ultimately, Lafler and Frye are as 
                                                                                                     
 103. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency & Participation in Criminal 
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912–14 (2005) (describing the shift from lay 
and local participation to professionalized criminal justice); William J. Stuntz, 
Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1973–74 (2008) (same); see also 
Colquitt, supra note 12, at 698 (describing plea-bargaining as local law). 
 104. See supra notes 3–12 and accompanying text. 
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noteworthy for what they leave unsaid as what they said. That is, 
neither case reached both prongs of the constitutional 
ineffectiveness test, which are deficient performance and 
consequent prejudice. In Frye, the Court held that a defense 
attorney’s wholesale failure to inform her client of a formal offer 
constitutes categorically deficient performance, but the Court 
remanded for a prejudice determination.105 In Lafler, the Court 
addressed prejudice, but the State conceded deficient 
performance in circumstances where the attorney advised the 
defendant to reject a plea based upon the profoundly erroneous 
advice that no jury would convict the defendant of attempted 
murder for shooting the victim only in the extremities.106  
Between the two decisions, Lafler potentially breaks much 
more ground. Frye would seem to stand only for the hard rule 
that defense counsel must relay all formal offers to clients. In 
Lafler, the Court also suggested that defense counsel must advise 
clients of the appropriate course and perhaps even persuade 
clients to accept manifestly favorable offers.107 And the measure 
of whether a particular offer is manifestly favorable is not a 
purely (or even principally) legalistic determination; it is a 
probabilistic evaluation. Indeed, it is sometimes even an 
extralegal evaluation to the extent that the decision is informed 
by equitable, practical, or instrumental considerations beyond 
law. Necessarily, such an approach entails richer conceptions of 
notice and fairness—conceptions intended to help clients 
appreciate all of their options and all of the implications of 
accepting or foregoing bargains. Such an approach demands that 
counsel give clients the benefit of learned courthouse wisdom.  
Of course, a close reader of the cases can discern only so 
much from decisions that have each left undiscussed one half of 
the constitutional test. Keeping to Lafler, however, the reader 
may conclude fairly that the Court could not have intended to 
reform radically constitutional prejudice but not also 
performance.108 And the Court did radically reform constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 105. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1403 (2012). 
 106. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383, 1386 (2012). 
 107. See infra Part VII. 
 108. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 127–28 (“[I]t is hard 
to imagine that the Court intended to reorient the focus of only the prejudice 
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prejudice. Previously, the Court had held that to demonstrate 
bargaining prejudice, the defendant had to show a reasonable 
probability that he would have prevailed at trial.109 In this way, 
the Court had pegged effective bargaining to trial practice and its 
emphasis on guilt accuracy.110 However, in Lafler, the Court 
acknowledged that a defendant may also be prejudiced if he 
“lose[s] benefits he would have received in the ordinary course”—
that is, if he ends up with an atypically bad bargain.111 Here, the 
measure of what the defendant “would have received in the 
ordinary course” depends upon some evaluation of local practice, 
which, in turn, may operate independently of (or even counter to) 
code law. And, notably, the Court cautioned that when a lawyer 
fails to bargain effectively and the case proceeds to trial, the 
                                                                                                     
prong and not also the performance prong of the ineffectiveness test.”).   
 109. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
 110. Id. Previously, I argued: 
[T]he Hill standard is designed to recognize only a certain kind of 
prejudice—that is, prejudice sufficient to impact the “binary” decision 
to plead guilty or go to trial. . . . [T]he Court announced a prejudice 
standard that is unconcerned with the fairness of the deal, and is 
instead concerned only with the accuracy of the guilt 
determination. . . . For many defendants, it is the substance of the 
plea deal that matters much more than the accuracy of the 
underlying conviction. . . . In this way, the Hill Court evaluated the 
guilty plea not on its own terms but against the yardstick of trial 
accuracy. 
Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 20, at 111–13; see also Jenny 
Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOWARD L.J. 693, 696 (2011) 
(criticizing Hill because it “assumes that rejection of a guilty plea has only one 
outcome—trial”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1931 (“The potential 
unfairness in the typical plea bargain is not that the defendant gives up some 
legal entitlements, but that he may not get enough from the government in 
return.”). 
 111. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (emphasis added); see also RONALD J. ALLEN, 
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEBRA A. LIVINGSTON & ANDREW D. 
LEIPOLD, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SUPPLEMENT 25 (2012) (“The 
favorable sentence that eluded the defendant in the criminal proceeding appears 
to be the sentence he or others in his position would have received in the 
ordinary course . . . .”); Roberts, supra note 90 (manuscript at 10) (observing 
that a defendant may now show prejudice by demonstrating that “it was 
reasonably likely that [a sentencing consequence] could have been avoided 
through ‘creative bargaining’”). 
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convicted defendant is prejudiced by the very trial sentence that 
the code law prescribed (or even mandated).112 Thus, the Court 
concluded, “a reliable trial” is an “insufficient . . . backstop t[o] 
inoculate[] any errors” of bargaining counsel.113 The defendant 
was compelled to risk a trial when an (obviously better) plea 
course was available, and he thereby missed out—or, to put it in 
the Court’s terms, suffered a “loss of the plea opportunity” to 
plead guilty on better terms.114  
Moreover a lost opportunity to plead guilty is not suffered 
exclusively by the innocent defendant. (Indeed, one would hope 
that innocent defendants rarely plead guilty, even if that hope is 
ultimately unrealistic.)115 Accordingly, the Court observed that 
the bargaining right to counsel is guaranteed equally to “the 
innocent and the guilty alike.”116 Significantly, then, the Court’s 
presumption of guilt and its attendant indifference to legal 
accuracy have served to produce an all-inclusive right to counsel. 
Comparatively, in Strickland v. Washington,117 the Court 
provided that “the defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.”118 
In the trial context, this standard means that the defendant must 
demonstrate that the absence of competent counsel “undermined 
confidence” in the guilt accuracy of the jury’s verdict.119 Again, 
the right to trial counsel remains accuracy-oriented: it is 
concerned primarily with ensuring that the defendant retains the 
capacity to exercise legal rights against coercion, at least in 
advance of an accurate judicial adjudication that the exercise of 
state power is appropriate. By contrast, the right to bargaining 
                                                                                                     
 112. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1387. 
 115. See generally Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1117 (2008) [hereinafter Bowers, Punishing the Innocent]. 
 116. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (“[W]e decline to hold either that the guarantee 
of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it 
attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual guilt.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 117. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 118. Id. at 694. 
 119. Id. 
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counsel is fairness-oriented: it is concerned primarily with 
ensuring that the defendant retains the capacity to succumb to 
state power on the best available terms. Thus, a manifestly guilty 
defendant is better protected at bargain than at trial because, to 
show prejudice, he need establish only a reasonable probability 
that counsel’s errors stood in his way of receiving a better plea. 
Put differently, only the bargaining right to counsel is designed to 
accommodate relative differences in sentence length across guilty 
defendants.  
There is nothing all that new to the notion that the Court 
sometimes has regulated pleas more aggressively (or, at least, 
more inclusively) than trials. Such a counterintuitive result may 
be traced to the prevailing methodological divide between 
fairness and accuracy. Consider, for example, the early plea-
bargaining case, Santobello v. New York.120 The Court held that a 
prosecutor had violated due process by failing to fulfill a plea 
promise to make no sentencing recommendation.121 Significantly, 
the Court assumed that the prosecutor breached the agreement 
inadvertently and that the judge was unaffected by the 
prosecutor’s recommendation in any event. Nevertheless, the 
Court provided a constitutional remedy.122 The touchstone was 
procedural unfairness, not substantive inaccuracy.  
To the contrary, the Court has taken a dimmer view of trial 
unfairness in circumstances in which the procedure in question 
left guilt accuracy unaffected. So, for instance, in Darden v. 
Wainwright,123 the Court refused to hold that the prosecutor had 
violated due process with an inflammatory closing argument 
that, according to the Court, “should make conscientious 
prosecutors cringe.”124 Specifically, the prosecutor ranted that the 
defendant was an “animal” who should be kept on a “leash” with 
                                                                                                     
 120. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
 121. See id. at 262 (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”). 
 122. See id. at 262–63 (“[W]e conclude that the interests of justice and 
appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises 
made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the 
case to the state courts for further consideration.”). 
 123. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). 
 124. Id. at 189 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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his face “blown . . . off.”125 Nevertheless, because the comments 
did not affect the outcome of the trial—that is, because they did 
not implicate guilt accuracy—the Court concluded that they were 
beyond the reach of constitutional law.126 Comparing Santobello 
and Darden, we learn that the Court may be willing to 
constitutionally regulate sloppy and unprofessional prosecutorial 
efforts at plea that it is unwilling to regulate at trial. Likewise, 
comparing Lafler and Strickland, we learn that the Court may be 
willing to constitutionally regulate defense errors at plea that it 
is unwilling to regulate at trial. 
Justice Marshall has earned the posthumous last laugh. In 
his Strickland dissent, Justice Marshall faulted the Court for 
prioritizing trial accuracy to fairness: “[T]he assumption on which 
the Court’s holding rests is that the only purpose of the 
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to 
reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convicted.”127 
Now, Justice Scalia has faulted the Court for prioritizing 
bargaining fairness to accuracy: 
Anthony Cooper received a full and fair trial, was found guilty 
of all charges by a unanimous jury, and was given the 
sentence that the law prescribed. . . . [E]ven though there is no 
doubt that the respondent here is guilty of the offense with 
which he was charged; even though he has received the 
exorbitant gold standard of American justice—a full-dress 
criminal trial[;] . . . the Court says that his conviction is 
invalid because he was deprived of his constitutional 
entitlement to plea-bargain. I am less saddened by the outcome 
of this case than I am by what it says about this Court’s 
attitude toward criminal justice.128 
                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 192 (quoting prosecutor: “I wish I could see him sitting here with 
no face, blown away by a shotgun”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “[e]very defendant”—even the “manifestly” guilty 
defendant—“is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and 
conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer”). 
 128. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392, 1397–98 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see also Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 35, 36 (2012) (“[The] flaw in Justice Scalia’s dissent is his assumption 
that nothing matters except for factual guilt.”). 
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Justice Scalia is saddened by the Court’s recognition that trial 
and bargaining counsel operate on different planes, and that the 
measure of effective assistance of bargaining counsel is not 
reducible to some easy legalistic measure of guilty accuracy. For a 
proponent of “the rule of law as a law of rules,”129 this may be a 
hard pill to swallow, but that makes it no less true. 
Finally, by promoting awareness of all (or, at least, many) of 
the relevant external facts—and not just of the relevant 
procedural and substantive law—the Court also may have 
indirectly mitigated the harshness of consequent guilty pleas. 
After all, full information—about, for instance, the availability 
and merits of an offer—maximizes the defendant’s opportunities 
to shortcut creatively the substantive unfairness of legally 
supported criminal charges.  
It is my position that tools ought to exist to circumvent law. 
Remarkably, the Court now apparently shares that extralegal 
position.130 Thus, it is the local conception of “the sound 
administration of criminal justice” that matters to the 
effectiveness inquiry far more than centralized legislative 
command. And it is the lost opportunity to bargain creatively that 
matters far more than the “full-dress criminal trial,”131 for the 
trial is concerned with the law as it is, whereas the bargain—
consistent with contract principles—is concerned principally with 
the law as the parties make it. 
VII. The Implications of the Emergence of Professional Persuasion 
By establishing a constitutional right to bargain, the Court 
arguably has opened the door to a requirement that a defense 
                                                                                                     
 129. Antonin Scalia, The Rule as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1175 (1989). 
 130. Perhaps it is unsurprising that Justice Kennedy wrote Padilla, Lafler, 
and Frye. Among the Justices, Kennedy has shown himself to be particularly 
sympathetic to equitable circumvention of substantive law. Anthony M. 
Kennedy, Keynote Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 
(Aug. 9, 2003), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches. 
aspx?Filename=sp_08-09-03.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (urging the ABA to 
“consider a recommendation to reinvigorate the pardon process”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 131. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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attorney not only inform a client of the law and facts of the case, 
but also that she exercise legal and extralegal persuasion.132 
Persuasion, in this context, may operate in either of two 
directions: the defense attorney may be obliged to exercise what 
Tony Amsterdam has called “considerable persuasion” (1) to 
convince the prosecutor to offer a defendant-favorable plea, 
and/or (2) to convince the defendant to accept that offer.133  
Questions remain about the direction and degree to which 
the Court has obliged the defense attorney to bargain.134 Because 
the Lafler Court did not reach the performance prong of the 
ineffectiveness test, it never determined whether the defense 
attorney erred constitutionally by misadvising the client to reject 
the plea. But, again, the Court’s willingness to recraft prejudice 
indicates that it, too, agreed with the parties that the attorney’s 
performance was deficient. However, it still remains unclear 
whether the mistake at issue amounted to an erroneous reading 
                                                                                                     
 132. See id. at 1376, 1384 (majority opinion) (“During plea negotiations 
defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); cf. Hawkman v. Parratt, 661 
F.2d 1161, 1171 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e do not hold that defense counsel always 
has a duty to initiate plea bargaining negotiations. The legal inquiry into 
whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance necessarily encompasses 
consideration of many relevant factors.”); Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa 
Main, “Waiving” Goodbye to Rights: Plea Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma 
of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029, 1052 (2011) 
(observing pre-Cooper and Frye that a “criminal defense attorney. . . may even 
have a duty to seek out plea negotiations with the prosecution”). 
 133. ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, 1 TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL 
CASES 5, § 201 (5th ed. 1988) (“[O]ften counsel can protect the client from 
disaster only by using a considerable amount of persuasion to convince the 
client.”); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.1 (3d ed. 1993) (“Once the lawyer has 
concluded that it is in the best interests of the accused to enter a guilty plea, it 
is proper for the lawyer to use reasonable persuasion to guide the client to a 
sound decision.”); Steve Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance 
& Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 895–907 (1998) (discussing 
counsel’s emerging obligation—ethically and legally—to engage in reasonable 
persuasion); Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 127 (discussing 
counsel’s obligation to exercise “reasonable persuasion”). 
 134. Cf. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1412–13 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[D]oes a hard-bargaining ‘personal-style’ now violate the Sixth 
Amendment? The Court ignores such difficulties. . . . It will not do simply to 
announce that they will be solved in the sweet by-and-by.”). 
TWO RIGHTS TO COUNSEL 1165 
of the substantive law, an erroneous prediction of juror behavior, 
an erroneous appraisal of the value of the plea, or an erroneous 
forecast of the probability of a better plea. Likely, the lawyer 
made some amalgam of errors. And that is just the point: an 
attorney’s bargaining mistakes do not always segregate cleanly 
into legal and extralegal categories. And, to the extent the 
defense attorney’s mistakes consisted of a practice error about the 
wisdom of the plea offer, it may follow that defense attorneys are 
now obliged to exercise sufficient persuasion to ensure that, in 
practice, their clients get and take good deals.135 
Moreover, I am not alone in reading Lafler and Frye to 
potentially obligate the defense attorney to exercise some amount 
of persuasion. According to Jenny Roberts, one of the contributors 
to this volume: 
The majority could have drawn a constitutional line between 
the defense counsel–client conversation and the defense 
counsel–prosecutor conversation, declining to regulate the 
latter. Instead, the Court’s recent plea jurisprudence is firmly 
grounded in the “reality” of the central role plea bargaining 
plays in the criminal justice system. . . . [I]f the prosecutor 
does not, must defense counsel take steps to explore the 
alternatives? It is difficult to conceive of counsel’s role, 
particularly in a system where so many cases are resolved 
through bargaining, that does not include such a duty.136 
The Court’s unmistakable tenor is that the defense attorney is 
now compelled to bargain aggressively, and the Court is 
committed to aggressively regulating counsel’s efforts.  
Aggressive constitutional regulation of this kind, however, is 
not without paradox. First, aggressive regulation fosters a more 
efficient market, which in turn, may serve to generate still more 
pleas.137 The Court has improved not only the quality of defense 
                                                                                                     
 135. Indeed, this is what the Second Circuit previously held in Boria v. 
Keane—a case that, until Lafler, had appeared to be little more than an outlier. 
Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996). Specifically, in Boria, the court held 
that the defendant had established ineffective assistance of bargaining counsel 
when his attorney failed to push him to take a manifestly favorable plea to avoid 
a “suicidal” trial.  Id. at 497.  
 136. Roberts, supra note 90 (manuscript at 11). 
 137. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 126 (“[A] 
constitutionally regulated market is predictable and user-friendly . . . . In this 
vein, even decisions that have limited prosecutorial bargaining authority . . . 
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counsel, but also the prosecutor’s capacity to send a clear signal 
that the failure to plead guilty is likely to be “suicidal.”138 That is, 
the more effective the bargaining defense attorney, the more 
keenly aware the defendant is made of the coercive power of the 
State. The defense lawyer may even become something of a 
conscripted agent, enlisted into the prosecutor’s efforts to push 
the defendant to plea.139 Indeed, it would seem doubtful that this 
reality was lost on the Court. Rather, much of the Court’s plea-
bargaining jurisprudence appears to be animated by the fear that 
a defendant who considers a plea procedure unfair is likelier to 
gum up the system by taking his case to trial.140 By contrast, a 
defendant who considers trial procedures unfair is likelier to opt 
for an efficient bargain. The Court’s incentive is to regulate the 
fairness of bargaining and plea procedures more aggressively 
than trial procedures.  
Ultimately, then, there exists a complicated interplay 
between plea-bargaining and coercion—narrowly, between plea-
bargaining and draconian substantive criminal codes. By 
compelling the defense attorney to bargain hard around unfair 
code law (and to exercise “considerable persuasion” in her 
dealings with both the State and her client), the Court has 
facilitated the substantive circumvention of law in the name of 
procedural fairness. But substantive and procedural fairness can 
be achieved only when and if the prosecutor is willing to bargain 
(and only when and if the defendant is willing to pay for 
substantive and procedural fairness by sacrificing trial rights).141 
Simply, the defendant still lacks the capacity to challenge 
constitutionally the substantive fairness of the underlying 
coercive charge. He possesses only the procedural right to a 
                                                                                                     
have reinforced the plea bargaining regime and thereby promoted the 
government’s interest in expeditious case processing.”).  
 138. Boria, 99 F.3d at 497. 
 139. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 126–27 (discussing 
the effects of “conscripted counsel”). 
 140. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (describing 
the benefits of requiring fair plea procedures because pleas are “highly 
desirable . . . for many reasons”). 
 141. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385, 1387 (2012) (observing that 
“[i]f no plea offer is made, . . . the issue [of bargaining ineffectiveness] . . . simply 
does not arise”). 
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competent lawyer who is compelled to do what she can do to get 
the defendant out from under that unfair charge.  
 Second, the Court has not only subjected professional 
practice to constitutional oversight, it has entrenched more 
deeply the professionalization of practice. That is, only 
professionals may take account of extralegal fairness 
considerations, notwithstanding the fact that, as I have argued 
many times before, laypeople are probably better equipped to 
reach some kinds of normative judgments.142 Of course, 
professionals are experts in the art of practice, but laypeople are 
experts in the art of moral reasoning, and both skills are relevant 
to the question of what constitutes a fair and appropriate plea 
deal. Yet, Padilla, Lafler, and Frye have served to marginalize 
further from the criminal justice system the already quite-
marginal layperson because, ultimately, such decisions make the 
measure of fairness not a moral measure but a measure of 
prevailing courthouse practice. Extralegal business is a 
professional business that remains none of a layperson’s 
business.143 
Notwithstanding the differences between trial and 
bargaining practice, the two are similar in one significant way: 
each fails to take full or effective advantage of lay participation. 
That is, in both contexts, laypeople are prohibited de jure from 
doing what they do best—practicing equitable discretion. A trial 
juror retains only the power to nullify, but not the right (meaning 
that an exercise of nullification is impermissible but that there is 
                                                                                                     
 142. See Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 332 (2012) (“[M]oral questions are eminently 
accessible to the layperson and distinctly within her capacity.”); Josh Bowers, 
Mandatory Life and the Death of Equitable Discretion 20 (Va. Law Public Law 
and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 2011-12) (“There are plausible 
reasons to believe that lay bodies contextualize the retributive inquiry better 
than legal technicians.”); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and 
the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1723 (2010) 
(“Law enforcement and adjudication are intended to be equitably individualized, 
but . . . professional functionaries . . . act according to idiosyncratic rules, norms, 
preferences, and biases.”). 
 143. Cf. Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, supra note 128, at 37 (discussing 
the anemic moral roles of jurors in contemporary plea-bargaining and the 
criminal justice system, more generally). 
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no remedy for it).144 More to the point, a defense attorney is 
prohibited from urging a trial jury to nullify.145 Ironically, 
however, post-Lafler, a defense attorney is not just permitted but 
perhaps obligated to make these very same extralegal arguments 
to the prosecutor at the bargaining stage. That is, the defense 
attorney may be compelled to press for an equitable (and 
extralegal) exception from otherwise applicable code law.  
To a degree, this is as it should be. Trials are (and should be) 
comparatively more structured than the less formal and more 
discretionary domains of charging, bargaining, and sentencing. 
The domain of trial is—and ought to remain—a domain of 
predefined law. At the trial, legal accuracy is the appropriate and 
central question, and, therefore, it ought to play a more 
significant role than extralegal persuasion. Nevertheless, I am on 
record in support of reforms intended to involve lay decision-
makers (at least somewhat) in the extralegal—or discretionary—
domains of criminal procedure (like charging and potentially also 
bargaining and sentencing).146 Of course, a layperson lacks the 
practice wisdom to comprehend effectively the intricacies, norms, 
and customs of the local courthouse, but she has practical 
wisdom. By contrast, the professional is likelier to lack the will or 
capacity to consistently act upon practical wisdom, because she 
operates under institutional and cognitive biases distinct to her 
role.147 An optimal institutional design would incorporate both lay 
                                                                                                     
 144. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 
253, 283 (1996) (“The Supreme Court has also been surprisingly quiet about the 
right to nullify, but when it did speak, it severely undercut the claim that the 
doctrine is constitutionally protected.”). 
 145. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895) (“[I]t cannot be 
regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by 
the court.”); Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[D]efense counsel 
may not press arguments for jury nullification in criminal cases.”); United 
States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1189–90 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that the 
trial judge “may block defense attorneys’ attempts to serenade a jury with the 
siren song of nullification”). 
 146. See supra note 142 (citing sources). 
 147. See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, supra note 142, at 1690 (“Legal proficiency, therefore, 
comes at a cost of some loss of practical wisdom, or, at least, some loss of 
capacity to freely exercise it. Conversely, a one-off lay perspective entails a 
‘simple ordinariness’ that may prove superior to professional perspective in 
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and professional insights. It would ensure that laypeople and 
professionals work together—sharing power—in order to tap 
effectively the respective wisdom of each. In the right-to-counsel 
context, such power sharing may be of particular value: a 
criminal defendant needs more than the practical and legal 
expertise of the professional; he needs also the moral reasoning of 
the layperson.  
Ironically, the practice of nullification was borne of a deep lay 
“distrust of legal professionals” and a corresponding preference 
for “natural justice” over “black-letter law.”148 In the 
contemporary criminal justice system, however, substantive 
equitable discretion is the dominion of these very same 
professionals who control the practice of plea-bargaining (which 
is the prevailing outlet for equitable expression in contemporary 
criminal justice). Decisions like Padilla, Lafler, and Frye—and, 
for that matter, Santobello, Bordenkircher, and Brady—do little 
more than ensure that such professional practice is 
constitutionally well-regulated. Nevertheless, an efficient and 
professional circumvention market may be a passable alternative 
to better options that the Court may be wholly unwilling to 
pursue: aggressive substantive constitutional regulation or 
meaningful lay involvement in equitable decision-making. That 
is, the Court’s approach may constitute the pragmatic (and even 
normatively compelled) best course for a pathological system of 
criminal justice that depends not only on procedural horse 
trading, but also substantive mandatory sentencing statutes that 
ill serve any sound conception of proportionality or crime control. 
If we lack the political or judicial will to reign in runaway 
substantive criminal codes, we may depend upon second-order 
tools to mitigate some of the most deleterious effects. One such 
tool is the provision of a defense lawyer who is sometimes obliged 
constitutionally to push hard to convince prosecutors not to follow 
the law.  
Prosecutors rely on tough statutes for plea-bargaining 
leverage. (Indeed, the Frye Court acknowledged that many 
“longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining 
                                                                                                     
equitable contexts.”). 
 148. Steven M. Warshawsky, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and 
Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 GEO. L.J. 191, 199 (1996).  
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purposes.”)149 And, thus, tough statutes promote plea-bargaining. 
At the same time, bargaining also often provides the only way 
out. In this way, cases like Padilla, Lafler, and Frye reflect 
concurrently the triumph of plea-bargaining and the frank 
understanding that what lawyers do without law is sometimes 
more important than what they do within it. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The practice of plea-bargaining and the constitutional right 
(or rights) to counsel always have had a complicated relationship. 
On the one hand, Gideon and its progeny have made criminal 
process more costly and thereby have compelled greater reliance 
on plea-bargains and guilty pleas. The Court even has used the 
presence of counsel as a ground to legitimate constitutionally the 
practice of plea-bargaining. Consider, for instance, the Brady 
Court’s efforts to distinguish permissible bargaining pressure 
from the involuntary confession “obtained by any direct or 
implied promises, however slight.”150 For the Court, the presence 
of counsel was key: 
[W]ith a confession given by a defendant in custody, alone and 
unrepresented by counsel . . . , even a mild promise of leniency 
was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because the 
promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at 
such times are too sensitive to inducement and the possible 
impact on them too great to ignore and too difficult to assess. . . . 
[The confession] situation bears no resemblance to [plea-
bargaining] . . . . [The pleading defendant] had competent 
counsel and full opportunity to assess the advantages and 
disadvantages of a trial as compared with those attending a 
plea of guilty; there was no hazard of an impulsive and 
improvident response to a seeming but unreal advantage.151 
Finally, the presence of counsel may generate more guilty pleas, 
precisely because defense lawyers are persuasive. Bad agents 
                                                                                                     
 149. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). 
 150. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (quoting Bram v. 
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897)). 
 151. Id. at 754. 
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may push clients to plead guilty to minimize workload.152 Good 
agents may push clients to plead guilty to avoid trial disasters.153 
On the other hand, the practice of plea-bargaining has 
compelled the Court to take a hard and clear-eyed constitutional 
look at real-world practice. The Court has come to understand 
that competent counsel demands more than just attention to law 
and that the judiciary, in turn, cannot regulate adequately 
defense lawyers without also regulating the extralegal aspects of 
their practice.  
Consider how far the system has come. At common law, the 
defense attorney was limited typically to legal arguments. As one 
eighteenth century trial judge explained the rule to a defendant 
at the Old Bailey: “Your counsel is not at liberty to state any 
matter of fact . . . . [T]hey are here to speak to any matters of law 
that may arise; but if your defense arises out of a matter of fact, 
you must yourself state it to me and the jury.”154 It is now well 
established that defense counsel is equipped to do much more 
than speak to matters of law. They may speak to facts that 
support legal defenses at trial and also to facts that support legal 
and extralegal mitigation at bargain and plea.  
By now, the Court has progressed far along the path toward 
finishing what it started in Brady and Santobello. The Court has 
made one domain beyond formal law—that is, plea-bargaining—a 
domain of unique constitutional control. This is a right and 
proper approach, because plea-bargaining, ultimately, is a 
domain that is unique. It is a domain that has less to do with 
legal guilt and “testing the prosecution’s case.” It is a domain that 
has much more to do with understanding comparative costs. It is 
a domain where the good lawyer strikes favorable deals and the 
bad lawyer pushes her clients in the direction of disadvantageous 
                                                                                                     
 152. Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, supra note 115, at 1151 (“[T]he lazy 
lawyer has an increased incentive to diligently pursue plea negotiations, 
because . . . [it] maximizes chances that the lawyer will not have to invest 
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 153. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 126 (“[I]f a prosecutor 
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374). 
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deals or, worse, procedurally fair but eminently bleak trials. It is 
a domain where the right to extralegal counsel may cash out as 
little more than a substantive transfer of bargaining power from 
the prosecutor to the defendant. But, within that domain, the 
ability to extract cheaper pleas amounts to a constructive reform. 
It serves as a welcome counterweight to prosecutors’ almost 
unfettered charging discretion to set starting prices so very high. 
